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Abstract 
In this paper, using a large sample covering the 10 years from 1998 to 2009, we examine the 
role of audit quality in earnings quality (discretionary accruals and income smoothing) and 
cost of equity capital of Indian firms. We find evidence that firms employing high quality 
auditors experience higher earnings quality and lower cost of equity capital. We find that 
firms belonging to business groups have higher earnings quality and lower cost of equity 
capital than their non-business group counterparts. The results do not change after utilising 
alternative proxies for audit quality, earnings quality and cost of equity. Our findings 
contribute significantly to the literature on the role of audit quality as an effective monitoring 
mechanism as reflected in firm level earnings quality and cost of equity capital of listed firms 
in India which has distinct institutional features in relation to ownership structures and 
operations.  
Key words: India, Corporate Sector, Earnings Management, Income smoothing, Cost of 
Equity Capital, Audit Quality. 
JEL Classification: M40, M41, M42. 
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Effects of Audit Quality on Earnings Quality and Cost of Equity Capital: Evidence 
from India 
 
1. Introduction 
 In this paper, using a large sample of Indian corporations over ten years, we examine the 
monitoring role of external auditors on financial reporting quality and firms‟ cost of equity.  
Financial reporting quality and the role of auditors have become an important issue following 
recent scandals involving large Indian companies. For example, ineffective corporate boards 
have allowed company corruption such as tunnelling of wealth to occur, and this has become 
a problem for regulatory bodies because it deprives shareholders of dividends and accurate 
information regarding firms‟ performance and financial position (Ghosh 2011). Chakrabarti 
(2005) reveals that some Indian business groups have even channelled substantial amounts of 
money via the ownership pyramid, totally depriving minority shareholders of their rightful 
gains.
1
  Many founding members have been caught manipulating earnings and appropriating 
wealth from shareholders (for example, Satyam Computer Services & Ketan).   
To improve financial reporting quality the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India 
(ICAI) has modified some accounting standards requiring firms to disclose additional 
information concerning related-party transactions, segment income (revenue, profit, and 
capital employed), deferred tax liabilities or assets, and consolidation of accounts in 2001-
2002 (Standard & Poor‟s 2009). However, it has been alleged that although there an adequate 
regulatory framework to monitor corporate operations including financial reporting and 
auditing is now in place in India, monitoring is proving not be as effective as it should be, 
resulting in mistrust within the corporate sector and a higher level of information asymmetry 
(Ghosh 2011; Goswami 2002).  Further, Ghosh (2011) notes a lack of reliance on domestic 
                                                             
1 Depriving minority shareholders of their rightful gains substantiates concerns expressed by Bertrand, Metha 
and Mullainathan (2002) that weak corporate law and careless enforcement mechanisms promote the risk of 
minority shareholders being expropriated.  
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auditors to provide assurance in India – most probably due to concerns around the quality of 
service offered to corporations. This situation has prompted external auditors to take on a 
more effective role in providing high quality assurance services and Indian corporations with 
a better governance structure (Standard & Poor‟s 2009; Topalova 2004).  The value of quality 
auditing arises because external auditors put constraints on managerial opportunistic 
behaviour and reporting discretion and, therefore, reduce information risk (Chen, Chen, Lobo 
and Wang 2011).   
 Although several studies have examined the effect of audit quality on financial 
reporting credibility in many countries (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; 
Khurana and Raman 2004; Teoh and Wong 1993), their results cannot be generalised to other 
countries such as India which has a distinctive and unique securities market and institutional 
setting.  In an emerging market context, Chen et al. (2011) examined the effect of audit 
quality on earnings management and cost of capital of state-owned and non-state-owned 
enterprises in China; however, China‟s institutional setting is distinctively different from that 
of India. For example, in India, along with government controlled public sector units (PSUs), 
there are multinational companies (MNCs) where foreign parent companies are the majority 
shareholders, and Indian business groups exist where the “promoters” (together with their 
friends and relatives) are the dominant shareholders. This latter group of firms plays a very 
important role in the Indian corporate sector, constituting about one-third in terms of number 
of companies, and over two-thirds in terms of revenue and profits (Chittoor, Dhole, and Lobo 
2012).  
This unique structure of family firms gives rise to a different type of agency costs 
known as “horizontal” agency costs between controlling shareholder groups – in particular, 
“promoters” and the affiliated business group – and potentially leads managers to act on 
behalf of the controlling family, but not necessarily on behalf of the shareholders 
4 
 
(Chakrabarti, Subramanian, Yadav, and Yadev 2012). Furthermore, in family firms and 
stand-alone firms it is very typical for ownership and management not to be segregated. This 
leads to informality in governance policies and inadequate controls (Standards and Poor‟s 
2009).  A further distinction is that the accounting and auditing profession in India is based 
on the British corporate tradition of competence and professional judgement and has operated 
as such for 100 years (since the Indian Companies Act of 1913).  On the other hand, China‟s 
auditing profession was influenced by the then Soviet Union and is still influenced by the 
Ministry of Finance via the China Institute of Certified Practising Accountants (CICPA), 
although the profession has changed markedly over the last 30 years by following the 
Western model. In India, only Indian qualified chartered accountants (CAs) (except for UK 
qualified CAs) are allowed to audit company accounts, while in China this rule does not 
apply. 
Although Chittoor et al. (2012) examined earnings quality of Indian corporations, our 
paper is different in that we address the role of quality of managerial absolute discretionary 
accruals, income smoothing and cost of capital. Chittoor et al. examined, among other things, 
whether or not high quality auditors (as a proxy for earnings quality) are appointed by Indian 
Business Groups (BG).    
Following previous studies (Becker et al. 1998; Chen et al. 2011), we use the 
magnitude of absolute discretionary accruals (|DACCR|) and income smoothing as a direct 
benchmark for the absolute magnitude of „economic income‟ and information risk to 
determine the role of audit quality in India in earnings quality. We also utilise ex ante cost of 
equity capital (Ke) to assess the valuation implications of audit quality, with the rationale that 
higher audit quality should lead to smaller equity capital costs, due to reduced information 
risk. We do this by analysing a sample of 7,308 firm-year observations for |DACCR|, In_Sm 
and Ke drawn from several industrial sectors. After controlling for a number of firm-specific 
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variables including whether companies belong to business groups, we find that the coefficient 
on high quality auditors is significantly negatively associated with absolute discretionary 
accruals, income smoothing and sample firms‟ cost of capital.  Several sensitivity tests – 
including alternative proxies for audit quality, such as Top 8 and audit fees, and an alternative 
measure of discretionary accruals, income smoothing and cost of equity – do not change our 
main findings. 
Our study contributes to existing literature on the role high quality auditors‟ play in 
constraining managerial discretionary accounting policy choices and income smoothing. It 
examines an emerging market context characterised by a less litigious environment where the 
penalty for corporate fraud is very low compared to other jurisdictions, and the professional 
accounting bodies most of the time condone audit failure, leading to lack of trust in and 
credibility of financial reporting (Chakrabarti 2005). By examining the capital market effect 
of employing high quality auditors in the form of cost of equity capital, we also extend the 
important work of Fan and Wong (2005) and Chen et al. (2011) in the context of Asia‟s 
second largest economy, India. Our study also generates new evidence to support previous 
claims that business groups experience lower discretionary accruals in their reported earnings, 
lower income smoothing and lower cost of equity capital. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the development 
of the stock market and the role of auditing in the Indian economy. In section 3 we develop 
our hypotheses. In section 4 we describe our sample and data collection processes, and 
develop our proxies for audit quality and measurement of earnings management and cost of 
equity capital. In section 5 we provide our model specifications. In sections 6 and 7 we 
discuss the results of our main and additional tests. In section 8 we present our conclusions 
and limitations of the study.  
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2. Background 
2.1 Development of the stock market in India 
From a state controlled economy, the Indian economy has undergone major restructuring and 
reform over the past sixty years, initially upon separation from British rule in the late 1940s, 
and then with liberalisation of the corporate sector in the early 1990s. The liberalisation of the 
economy and movement towards globalisation have sparked the growth of a strong 
investment culture, reduced dependence on state-owned enterprises, and generated a 
proliferation of private enterprises led by groups of entrepreneurial families.  Since 1997 the 
Indian economy has experienced an average growth of 7% per annum; the number of listed 
corporations has increased exponentially (there are currently 6335 listed companies on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). The market 
capitalisation of listed companies as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
to 93.46% in 2010, with a total market capitalisation around US$598.3 billion (Rs 30.13 lakh 
crore) which is one-tenth of the combined valuation of the Asia region (The World Bank 
2011). Associated with this rapid expansion of the economy, the government implemented 
wide-ranging changes in legislation and regulations, including the establishment of the 
Securities and Exchange Board in India (SEBI) in 1992, strengthened accounting regulatory 
and professional bodies, and gradually adopted and harmonised accounting standards issued 
by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) (Standard & Poor‟s 2009).   
However, the economic advances made in India have resulted in many upheavals.  
Although the Indian government controlled most of the manufacturing activities by the 
1970s, the banking sector to a significant extent still functioned as a private enterprise 
concern, but the process of privatisation following the adoption of liberal economic policies 
was hampered due to bureaucracy (Chakrabarti 2005; Goswami 2002).  Later, the 
government encouraged the establishment of more private banks to foster competition and the 
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Reserve Bank of India (RBI) reduced its direct interference with regard to credit and setting 
prices but enforced stronger disclosure norms and greater emphasis on: firstly, periodic RBI 
surveillance; and secondly, the government-appointed directors on the boards of private 
banks.  However, this process of appointing directors by RBI was gradually phased out, 
replaced by an emphasis on boards being elected rather than appointed from above.   
In May 1992, the government abolished the Capital Issues (Control) Act 1947 and the 
Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951, in their place establishing the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).  Gradually becoming more powerful, SEBI, with a 
primary focus on regulating and monitoring stock trading, has played a crucial role in 
establishing the basic minimum ground rules of corporate conduct in India. Chakrabarti 
(2005, p. 18) states that the SEBI may even be “the single most important development in the 
field of corporate governance and investor protection in India”. 
The equity market in India is dominated by the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and 
the National Stock Exchange (NSE), both located in Mumbai. The BSE is the oldest stock 
exchange in Asia (established in 1875) and has among the highest number of trades in the 
world. The NSE is a limited liability company owned by public sector financial institutions 
and now accounts for about two-thirds of stock trading in India, as well as nearly all of its 
derivatives trading. In 2010, the number of listed companies was about 6335 on the BSE and 
NSE combined.  However, there is a market concentration of large corporations as the top 
100 BSE companies represent nearly 86% of market capitalisation of the BSE. In comparison 
the top 100 NSE companies represented 57% of total market capitalisation of the NSE 
(ROSC 2004).  
Equity investment, either through the initial public offerings (IPO) or the secondary 
market route, is growing rapidly. The capitalisation of the domestic stock market increased 
by approximately 30% and it reached US $931 billion in March 2008. There is also a trend 
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toward international cross-listing by large Indian corporations, especially on the NYSE and 
Nasdaq which are reputed to maintain very high reporting standards, but the number is still 
very small and only one company, Infosys Technologies Limited, has secured a spot on 
Nasdaq‟s Global (Standard &  Poor‟s 2009).    
Compared to the equity market, the Indian debt market is not developed.  The market 
comprises two segments: government securities (G-Secs) and corporate debt, with the 
corporate debt amounting to about 14% of the total debt market. To increase the corporate 
debt market share several reforms have been undertaken directed at institutional development 
to enhance market activity, settlement and safety, enhancing liquidity and efficiency, and 
broadening investor base  (Standard & Poor‟s 2009).   
   The ownership structure that Indian companies have poses challenges with regard to 
opportunities for finance and marketing as well as constraints with respect to governance.   In 
a recent survey of the top 50 Indian companies that are listed on the Nifty Index, 54% of 
large Indian companies are controlled by a single family with as little as 12% to 20% of the 
voting shares (Standard & Poor‟s 2009) . This form of control is not common in most 
emerging countries because each entity is separately formed under the Companies Act and 
controlling rights spread across several friends and relatives and even across state-owned 
enterprises which remain traditionally passive, thus providing decision-making rights to 
promoters with relatively little ownership.   
 
2.2 Auditing in India 
The Companies Act, 1956 is the major statute governing the preparation of financial 
statements in accordance with the prevailing accounting standards and audit of the accounts 
prepared by companies in India.  The Act itself is based on the Indian Companies Act, 1913 
enacted by the British during the colonial period and has undergone several amendments with 
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regard to formation, operations, and governance in order to improve the weak nature of 
corporate governance in India‟s corporate environment (Bertrand et al. 2002; Ghosh 2011).  
The Act of 1956 specifically requires the preparation, presentation, publication, and 
disclosure of financial statements; and an audit of all companies by a member of the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants in India (ICAI) formed under the Chartered Accountants Act 1949 
(Ghosh 2011, p. 352).
2
  The Income Tax Act 1961 requires an audited balance sheet and 
profit and loss statements, with a copy certified by a chartered accountant, to be submitted by 
all public companies with their tax returns.    
The ICAI also puts responsibility on its members to examine compliance with 
prevailing accounting standards in the presentation of financial statements while conducting 
their audits, and its members are liable for disciplinary action under the provisions of 
Chartered Accountants Act of 1949 if he/she has not reported non-compliance (ICAI 2004).  
The 1949 Act was revised in 2003 in the wake of accounting irregularities in the US in the 
early 21
st
 century, and sought to reconfigure the current regulatory regime and the 
disciplinary arrangements relating to the accounting profession in India (Ghosh 2011). Such 
reconfiguration was partly due to responses made relating to the Report on the Committee on 
Corporate Audit and Governance issued in late 2002 which, in light of corporate scandals 
abroad, looked closely at audit standards, management controls, and broad accounting 
effectiveness (Topalova 2004). Although enough legal provisions are in place, Chakrabarti 
(2005) notes that the ICAI has not been known to take action against erring auditors, creating 
a potentially serious issue surrounding the credibility of auditor actions and assurance 
services in India. 
Recognising the need for audit service providers to provide effective and high-quality 
assurance of firms‟ performance to all shareholders and stakeholders, ROSC (2004) reviewed 
                                                             
2 Companies are required to disclose information on the equity shareholdings of individual promoters, financial 
institutions, foreign institutional investors, foreign holdings, other corporate bodies, top 50 shareholders, other 
shareholders, and remuneration to company officers (Topalova 2004). 
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the role of auditing in India. The main areas of discussion included a need to more closely 
and effectively monitor and enforce compliance with requirements for timely and accurate 
disclosure of all material matters. Despite ROSC‟s (2004) review discussing some vital areas 
of disclosure and transparency, issues surrounding reliability on domestic audit service 
providers continue to prevail.  
The market for audit services in India is dominated by local firms because the Big-4 
audit firms‟ share is only 36% in India compared with other emerging countries such as 
Brazil (79%), China (14%), and Russia (43%) (Huber 2011). However, in recent years, the 
Big-4 global audit firms – Deloitte, Ernst & Young (E&Y), KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers – have grown tremendously in India due to firms‟ perceptions that a 
relationship with one of the Big-4 will give investors a better impression of them (Gupta 
2011). While market concentration by Big-4 auditing companies is not an issue in India, there 
are issues concerning market fragmentation because audit firms of varying sizes tend to audit 
listed firms.  In India, however, Big-4 International audit firms are not allowed to audit 
accounts under their own name, so they form links with local Indian chartered accounting 
firms and recruit Indian chartered accountants. For example, Deloitte has tie-ups with C. C. 
Chokshi, E&Y with S. R. Batliboi & Associates, KPMG with Bharat S. Routh & Associates, 
and the Indian affiliates of PricewaterhouseCoopers include Price Waterhouse firms and 
Lovelock and Lewes for audit work (Gupta 2011). Although this arrangement has existed for 
a few decades, it has raised concerns about the legal liability of the international Big-4 audit 
firms in relation to audit work undertaken in India. This is because their local partners are 
legally liable in the eyes of the regulatory bodies. In order to differentiate themselves from 
local firms, Big-4 firms claim to follow and implement high quality auditing codes and 
standards set by their international head office.  
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With regard to the perception of international accounting firms versus local firms, the 
Chartered Accountants Action Committee (CAAC) published a White Paper in 2002. It states 
that the corporate and finance sectors and the government and policy makers in India 
implicitly trust the Big-4 firms and their professed competence and ethical standards. 
However, this trust is considered to be “a type of colonial hangover” which leads to positive 
perceptions about Western institutions (Desai, Desai, Singhvi, and Munsif 2012, p. 153).  
Ghosh (2011) asserts that the services of domestic auditors may not be relied on in India; it is 
recognised that international audit firms operating in the country provide high-quality audit 
assurance services and, therefore, will rank in the top audit service providers in India. 
Whether such a positive perception associated with international audit firms translates into 
tangible benefits is an empirical question. 
Perhaps the most important issue with regard to auditing in India is that of the tie-ups 
between local firms and the Big-4 firms. This issue is particularly prevalent due to the nature 
of audit control in India – very little; coupled with the fact that international audit firms (such 
as those of the Big-4) are not allowed to market their services in India (Layak and Mehra 
2009). This creates the opportunity for companies to report fraudulently, as happened in the 
case of Satyam Computer Services. This fraud, in which PricewaterhouseCoopers failed to 
identify significant inflations in the value of assets and revenues earned by Satyam Computer 
Services, occurred due to little control over audit quality (Timmons and Wassener 2009) 
Evidently, the systems of “partner rotation” (in which clients are passed onto other partners) 
and “partner review” are not significant deterrents to the negligence of audit which exists 
because independent audit review is lacking in India (Layak and Mehra 2009). 
 
3. Hypotheses Development  
3.1 Effect of audit quality on discretionary accruals  
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Prior research consistently finds that high quality external audits act as a governance 
mechanism, and the utility of such monitoring is stronger when the corporate internal 
governance is weak (Desai et al. 2012).  The governance mechanism in Indian corporations is 
not as strong as in many developed countries, partly due to an informal governance structure 
and influential promoters making relational appointments to their company boards (Standard 
& Poor‟s 2009). The dominance of family business groups and appointment of senior 
executives from within the groups give rise to “horizontal agency costs” (as defined earlier) 
as distinct from “vertical agency costs” associated with diversified corporations. In both 
situations managerial opportunistic behaviour has been noted by academics and practitioners.  
As Goswami (2002, p. 93)
 3
 states, “[u]ntil the mid-1990s, India suffered from the worst of 
both types of agency costs. Dysfunctional economic and trade policies combined with low 
equity ownership allowed companies to thrive in uncompetitive ways.” Further, tunnelling 
has remained an important opportunistic managerial behaviour in Indian family groups of 
corporations. Bertrand et al. (2002, p. 126) state that “[b]usiness groups have come under 
particular scrutiny for advancing their private interests at the expense of outside 
shareholders”.  
Chakrabarti (2005) and Godbole (2002) observe that corporate boards have largely 
been ineffective in monitoring the actions of management in India and instead, have largely 
functioned as rubber stamps for the promoters.  The World Bank (2004) reports that 
institutional shareholding in India is yet to be developed as many institutional shareholders 
remain passive participants at company general meetings and are little involved in enforcing 
good governance standards, fail to exercise their status and voting power (The World Bank 
2004).  There is a lack of shareholder activism as most equity investors are relatively new 
                                                             
3 Goswami (2002) studied the boards of the top 100 listed private companies in India and found that most of 
these boards are numerically dominated by executive directors.  
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with short-term perspectives and have limited knowledge of securities, thus providing 
opportunities for managerial discretion.  
Managerial discretionary opportunism increases when executive compensation is tied 
to firm performance. In India, managerial compensation has traditionally been monitored by 
the SEBI, but in recent years this has been liberalised, allowing firms to set salaries based on 
fixed and variable components which include bonus options based on stock market 
performance.  In a weak corporate governance environment managers can extract benefits by 
manipulating earnings and demonstrate rent-seeking behaviour (Chakrabarti et al. 2012). 
The literature on earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals) is vast 
(see for example, Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2009; Verbruggen, Christiaens, and Milis 2008)
4
. 
Focusing specifically on auditing and earnings management, a study by Xie, Davidson and 
DaDalt (2003) found that the level of earnings management is inversely related to the extent 
of audit committee independence. Utilising data on a cross‐section of listed Indian 
manufacturing companies, Ghosh (2007) examined the relationship between internal 
monitoring through management, and external monitoring through auditors, and firm 
valuation. Findings revealed that internal monitoring and external monitoring were inversely 
related. More importantly, the analysis indicated that external monitoring led to an 
enhancement in firm value. Subsequently, with reference to quality of auditing, using a 
sample of non‐financial companies, Ghosh (2011) found that firms with high discretionary 
accruals are more likely to be audited by domestic entities. Secondly, multiple auditors are 
more likely for firms with high discretionary accruals. Lastly, he found that smaller and 
newer firms are most likely to be associated with domestic auditors. Chen et al. (2011) 
hypothesise that in China higher audit quality will lead to greater reduction in earnings 
management and cost of equity capital for NSOEs than for SOEs.  Using 3,310 firm-year 
                                                             
4  For audit and earnings management, see section 6.2. 
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observations over the years 2001 to 2004, Chen et al. (2011) detected support for the 
hypothesis, which they attributed to differential managerial incentives affecting both types of 
organisations.   
A recent cross‐country research on private firms in six European nations indicates that 
privately held companies engage less in earnings management when they have brand‐name 
auditors. This suggests that high quality auditors have the incentive to constrain earnings 
manipulation (Tandeloo and Vanstraelen 2008).
5
 Based on prior research and consistent 
findings, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: The level of discretionary accruals will be negatively associated with the 
quality of external audit. 
3.2 Effect of audit quality on income smoothing 
Businesses may smooth their earnings for a variety of reasons, for example smoothing their 
earnings in order to show steady profit growth can keep current investors happy and 
confident in the company. Secondly, manipulating the accounting numbers can generate 
interest from new investors resulting the company receiving a cash injection. Thirdly and 
finally, companies may engage in income smoothing in order for management to pass on 
inside information to give investors a better picture of the company‟s financial health. 
Potential reasons as to why high quality auditors may have an impact on the level of income 
smoothing a company engages are as follows. Firstly, as noted by DeAngelo (1981) in the 
United States the top four accounting firms impose a higher level of earning quality in order 
to protect their brand reputation and minimise risk exposure. Secondly, Simunic and Stein 
(1987) contend that since the top four accounting firms are part of an international 
organisation that operates globally, therefore, have incentives to have a uniform reputation 
                                                             
5  It is expected that the quality of audit assurance will improve with a brand-name auditor. Furthermore, 
DeAngelo (1981), Palmrose (1986), Francis et al. (2004), and Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011) all 
provide evidence that audit fees rise when audit quality improves.   
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around the world. This would also apply to companies being audited by the Big-4 accounting 
firms in India. Evidence from past researchers such as Hogan and Jeter (1999) noted that 
audit quality reduces income smoothing. Furthermore, Bannister and Wiest (2001) concluded 
that better quality auditor limits the level of income smoothing. The results of the above 
research imply that high quality auditors can actually constrain the level of income smoothing 
businesses attempt to or can engage in.  
Therefore, based on the preceding discussion, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 2: The level of income smoothing will be negatively associated with the quality of 
external audit. 
3.3 Effect of audit quality on cost of equity capital 
Auditing reduces information risk faced by (uninformed) investors because it allows them to 
verify the validity of financial statements. If information risk is priced by investors, it is 
reasonable to argue that how investors perceive or price the information risk will vary with 
the effectiveness of auditing in reducing earnings management (Chen et al. 2011).  A high 
quality auditor acts as a strong monitoring mechanism and conveys a positive signal to the 
market: it is expected that investors will reward those firms for mitigating information 
asymmetry and for bonding themselves to a higher degree of scrutiny.  Numerous studies 
have investigated the effect of audit quality on risk and cost of equity capital.
6
 As Chen et al. 
(2011) summarise, auditing largely serves as a monitoring device designed to improve 
information about firm performance. Essentially, the aim of auditing is to improve 
information quality by reducing information asymmetry between the firm and interested 
parties, in particular, investors. Put simply, the greater the potential risk of information 
asymmetry, the greater the value of high-quality audit assurance (Francis, LaFond, Olsson 
and Schipper 2004 & 2005). Moreover, if auditing is highly effective at constraining earnings 
                                                             
6  Such studies include Ashbaugh and Warfield (2003), Easley and O‟Hara (2004), Lambert, Leuz and 
Verrecchia (2007), and Ghosh (2011).  
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management, the better audit quality will be at reducing information risk faced by investors 
(Chen et al. 2011). With higher audit quality and reduced information risk investors can make 
more informed decisions and, therefore, will reduce their required rate of return on 
investment (Lambert et al. 2007).
7
 
In India, governance is not as effective as it should be and consequently audits by 
high quality international firms send signals to investors about the quality of earnings, thus 
increasing their confidence.  Furthermore, firms with better reputations voluntarily employ 
reputable auditors to signal their good performance and show that they have nothing to hide.  
All these factors provide efficient signals to the capital market participants and reduce risk 
associated with information uncertainty, which would translate into lower cost of capital. 
Therefore, based on the preceding discussion, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 3: The cost of equity capital will be negatively associated with the quality of 
external audit. 
4. Research Methods 
4.1 Data 
Our initial sample comprised all Indian listed companies (listed on the BSE and the NSE) for 
the years 1998 to 2009.  However, due to non-availability of information, we could only 
obtain 8,408 firm-year observations for accruals management (│DACCR│) test, income 
smoothing (In_Sm),  cost of equity (Ke) test, and 7,370 firm-year observations for audit fees 
(Ln_Fees) test. Following prior research (Daske et al. 2008; Francis and Wang 2008), we 
excluded further observations from oil and gas, utilities, and financial services firms such as 
banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. Lastly, further observations with 
any variables registering in the top and bottom 1% were removed, as they were considered to 
be outliers. This left us with a final sample of 7,308 firm-year observations for (│DACCR│), 
                                                             
7 As Chen et al. (2011, p. 10) state, “the greater the information risk faced by investors, the greater the value of 
audit quality”.  
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In_Sm, Ke and 6,474 firm-year observations for Ln_Fees. Panel A of Table 1 summarises the 
details of our sample selection procedure and final sample size for │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the composition of our final sample for │DACCR│, In_Sm, 
Ke, and Ln_Fees for the years 1998 to 2009. For example, the composition of our final 
sample of 7,308 firm-years for │DACCR│, In_Sm, Ke, includes 242 in 1999, 187 in 2000, 
189 in 2001, 188 in 2002, 222 in 2003, 375 in 2004, 504 in 2005, 597 in 2006, 1,576 in 2007, 
1,614 in 2008, and 1,614 in 2009. On the other hand, the composition of our final sample of 
6,474 firm-years for Ln_Fees includes 128 in 1998, 144 in 1999, 172 in 2000, 196 in 2001, 
198 in 2002, 224 in 2003, 312 in 2004, 456 in 2005, 615 in 2006, 1,324 in 2007, 1,323 in 
2008, and 1,382 in 2009. Panel C of Table 1 shows the distribution of firm-years across 
industries. The most heavily represented industries for earnings management, based on 
│DACCR│, In_Sm, Ke, include Industrial goods & services (28.4%), followed by Personal 
& household goods (12.2%), and finally, Chemicals (10.8%). The most heavily represented 
industries for audit fees, based on Ln_Fees include Industrial goods & services (28.8%), 
followed by Personal & household goods (12.7%), and finally, chemicals (10.1%). 
4.2 Proxies for audit quality 
As argued by Lennox (1999), large auditors are more likely to give an accurate qualification 
to companies based on their financial situation. His findings showed that small audit firms, 
with an inaccuracy rate of 3.41%, were 1.19% more likely to issue an incorrect qualification 
regarding a client‟s declaration of bankruptcy (or lack of) rather than large auditors. This 
suggests that audits from the Big-4 are likely to be more accurate than that of their smaller 
counterparts; however, the reason for this is unclear. Lennox (1999) suggests such accuracy 
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occurs due to maintaining a good reputation. In a profession where an ethical norm is 
somewhat hazy, this is of key concern to the Big-4 audit companies, as their revenues are 
built primarily around auditing. Another key factor as to why these differences occur between 
small and large auditors is the depth of specialisation that large auditing firms enjoy, such as 
the Big-4 (Lennox 1999). Within such corporations, specialisation leads to industry-specific 
knowledge, which, in turn, will increase the accuracy of audits in the future. This is primarily 
through more accurate placement on what Lennox (1999) describes as the “cut-off probability” 
– that is, the point which determines which companies are given unqualified, and which are 
given qualified, audit reports. 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that size is a proxy for quality because no single client is 
important to a large audit firm. Large audit firms and their auditors have a greater reputation 
to lose if they misreport. Conversely, an audit firm with a small number of clients may 
logically conclude that they have more to gain by going along with their client and 
misreporting than rigorously following auditing standards and risking the potential loss of 
their client. In essence, DeAngelo (1981) concludes that larger audit firms have the incentive 
to provide higher quality audit services. However, given the recognition of the ineffective 
nature of audit standards historically, and the lack of punitive action taken against erring 
auditors in India, the arguments raised by DeAngelo (1981) may not be as applicable to the 
Indian setting. Although the legal and regulatory environment in India may not be as 
sophisticated as that in many Western nations, increased concern with litigation risk and loss 
of reputation from violating auditing regulations led to a series of reforms that began during 
the early 1990s. With various reforms, restructuring processes, and legal and regulatory 
amendments, large audit firms in India should be provided with ample motivation to 
differentiate themselves from smaller auditors.  
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Francis et al. (2004 & 2005) found that audit fees are higher for industry leaders, 
implying higher audit quality. Furthermore, higher audit fees imply higher audit quality either 
through a more thorough auditing effort or through the auditor having greater expertise. 
DeFond, Francis and Wong (2000) found that the top three industry leaders in Hong Kong 
earn a premium relative to other Big-4 auditors, while Ferguson, Francis and Stokes (2003) 
concluded that the top two industry leaders in Australia earn a premium relative to other Big-
4 auditors. Furthermore, Francis et al. (2005) document that the industry leader in the US has 
a fee premium relative to other Big-4 auditors. Consistent with these findings, that high audit 
fees relate to high audit quality, we proxy for audit quality by the level of audit fees.   
Evidence from audit report studies supports the contention that the Big-4 auditors are 
of higher quality. Becker et al. (1998) and Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999) indicate that 
clients of the Big-4 auditing companies have lower abnormal accruals. This implies less 
aggressive earnings management behaviour and, consequently, higher earnings quality. 
Consistent with these findings, Nelson, Elliott and Tarpley (2002) report evidence from one 
Big-4 accounting firm that auditors detect earnings management attempts and require clients 
to make appropriate adjustments. Francis and Krishnan (1999), Lennox (1999), and Weber 
and Willenborg (2003) report similar findings, providing evidence that Big-4 auditors report 
with greater accuracy than other firms, demonstrating higher audit quality. A related line of 
research, conducted by Simunic and Stein (1987) and Francis and Wilson (1988) argue that 
the large Big-8 international accounting firms have established brand name reputations and, 
therefore, are very motivated to protect their reputation by providing high-quality audits. 
With these findings considered, we use the Big-4 audit firms (Deloitte, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) as measures of audit quality in India. 
4.3 Measuring earnings quality 
20 
 
We employ two proxies for earnings quality.  First, consistent with Becker et al. (1998), 
Reynolds and Francis (2000), and Chen et al. (2011), we use absolute discretionary accruals 
(│DACCR│), as it is assumed that the magnitude of discretionary accruals best reflects the 
consequences of managerial earnings manipulation. Consistent with numerous other studies, 
such as Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000), Xie et al. (2003), Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) 
and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005), we utilise the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) 
model in order to derive a measure of discretionary accruals.
8
  
TAit / Ait-1 = α0 (1 / Ait-1) + α1 (ΔREVit - ΔRECit / Ait-1) + α2 (PPEit / Ait-1) + ε……………….… (1)    
We use the fitted coefficients for αo, α1, and α2, obtained from (1), to estimate DACCR 
as follows:   
│DACCRit│ / Ait-1 = TAit / Ait-1 – [ά0 (1 / Ait-1) + ά1 (ΔREVit - ΔRECit / Ait-1) + ά2 PPEit / Ait-1]... (2) 
Where TAit is total accruals of firm i for period of t, scaled by beginning of year total 
assets, At-1 is beginning of year total assets, │DACCRit│ is the absolute discretionary accruals 
of firm i for the period t, scaled by the beginning of year total assets, ΔREVit is change in 
revenue of firm i for period t-1 to t scaled by beginning of year total assets, ΔRECit is change 
in receivables of firm i for period t-1 to t scaled by beginning of year total assets, PPEit is 
gross property, plant and equipment of firm i for period t scaled by beginning of year total 
assets.  
Our second measure is income smoothing. Wysocki (2004) suggests using closeness- 
to- cash as a benchmark because it provides a direct benchmark for the absolute magnitude of 
„economic income‟. This overcomes the problem of absolute discretionary accruals which 
fails to identify a benchmark for the underlying „economic income‟. Using cash flow to 
                                                             
8 The modified Jones model is an extension by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) of the original Jones (1991) 
model, which adjusts the change in revenues for the change in receivables in the event period. Furthermore, 
while Subramanyam (1996) argues that measurement problems persist in cross-sectional models, Bernard and 
Skinner (1996) state that such problems are common to all earnings management studies.  
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calculate earnings smoothness makes earnings smoothness popular to measure earnings 
quality. 
Many researchers have used earnings smoothness as a measure of earnings quality 
(Leuz et al. 2003; Bowen et al. 2008 and Francis et al. 2004). However, there is disagreement 
in the literature about whether smoothness is desirable or not. Smoothness can be considered 
to be desirable earnings, which is derived from the idea that managers use their private 
information about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuation[s?] therefore they 
achieve a more representative reported earnings number (Francis et al. 2004). This is because 
current earnings are a good indicator of future earnings. However, Leuz et al. (2003) state 
that smoothness reflects the ability of managers to reduce the variability of reported earnings 
by altering the accounting standards. This allows managers to maintain benefits associated 
with capital market and earnings. Therefore, in this case earnings look smoother but they are 
of poor quality.  
Earnings smoothness can be measured in several ways; both methods use the 
volatility of earnings and cash flows. We use a method similar to that of Leuz et al. (2003) 
who measure earnings smoothness as the ratio of the firm-level standard deviation of 
operating earnings to the firm-level standard deviation of cash flow from operations (both 
scaled by beginning total assets).  
Smooth  
                                 
                                          
 
Where 
Smooth   = firm i‟s earnings smoothness in year t 
CFO              = firm i‟s operating cash flows in year t  
Operating Income =firm i‟s operating income in year t  
 
4.4 Measuring cost of equity capital 
To estimate firm-specific ex ante cost of equity capital we utilise the modified PEG method 
proposed by Easton (2004).  Botosan and Plumlee (2005) conclude that the modified PEG 
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ratio approach is a preferable measure of cost of equity capital because it dominates the other 
alternatives in the sense that it is consistently and predictably related to various risk measures. 
Based on this evidence, we measure the cost of equity capital in our analysis as follows:  
 
Ke = √(epst+2 – epst+1 + Ke * Divt+1) / Pt ……………………………………..….…………………(3) 
                                                                                                          
where Ke is the cost of equity capital, epst+1 is the one-year ahead forecast earnings 
per share, epst+2 is the two-year ahead forecast earnings per share, Divt+1 is the one year ahead 
forecast dividend, and Pt is the fiscal year-end price per share.  
 
5. Model specifications 
We use the following models to test our hypotheses. Equations 4 and 5 are related to earnings 
quality: discretionary accruals and income smoothing. The rationale is that audit quality is 
directly related to level of earnings quality, proxied by │DACCR│ and income smoothing. 
We also employ the rationale that audit quality is related to cost of equity capital:  
|DACCRit| = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Audit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α 6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε…………………………..…………………... (4) 
In_Smit = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε……………………………………….…….… (5) 
Keit = α0 + α1GROUPit+ α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6VOLATILITYit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε ……………………………………..... (6) 
 
│DACCR│ is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). GROUP is 1 for a firm that belongs to a 
business group, 0 for a firm that is a non-business group in year t. We follow Chittoor et al. 
(2012) who contend that Indian firms affiliated with business groups have higher earnings 
quality than non-business group firms. They argue there are spill-over effects of earnings 
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quality of one business group firm to other affiliates. Therefore, business group firms have 
the incentive to maintain high earnings quality so they do not transfer negative spill-over 
effects to other business group firms. To ensure the earnings quality of affiliate firms, some 
business groups may even have contracts stipulating how each affiliate should prepare and 
maintain its accounts. As Chittoor et al. (2012) discovered, business group firms are also 
more likely to engage top-10 auditors .To determine the validity of their findings, we have 
chosen to include business groups as a variable to see if business group affiliation is 
associated with the quality of earnings and thus control for its effect.  Top_4 is 1 for Top 4 
client firms, 0 for non-Top 4 client firms in year t and is expected to have a negative 
relationship with │DACCR│ (Francis & Wang 2008). Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of 
audit fees of firm i in year t and is expected to have a negative relationship with │DACCR│ 
(Hribar et al. 2010). Ln_Assets and F_Lev are included as control variables as Klein (2002) 
documents that discretionary accruals are negatively associated with company Ln_Assets and 
positively associated with F_Lev. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items for firm i 
in year t scaled by total assets included as a control variable in order to take into account 
company growth (Lee, Lev and Yeo 2007). L_Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t and 
t-1 reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 if otherwise in order to control 
for the performance of the company (Lee et al. 2007). Year dummies, a vector of dummy 
variables, indicates year. Industry dummies, a vector of dummy variables, indicates industry 
sector membership. 
In_Sm is the firm i‟s earnings smoothness in year t. Similar to the discretionary 
accruals model we also included all the interest variables (GROUP, Top_4 and Ln_Fees) and 
control variables and expected to be consistent with earlier results. 
On the other hand, Ke is the cost of equity of firm i in year t measured by the Easton 
(2004) model. GROUP is 1 for a firm that belongs to a business group, 0 for a firm that is a 
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non-business group in year t. According to Chittoor et al. (2012), business groups have 
stringent corporate governance mechanisms, utilise the expertise of high quality auditors, 
have strong political influence as they are major economic contributors, and demonstrate 
superior economic stability. Using these characteristics as the rationale that business groups 
provide less risky investment options for potential shareholders, it can be argued that they 
have a lower cost of equity [As Chittoor et al. (2012, p. 4) argue, “[business groups] serve to 
reduce risks by smoothing out income flows and reallocating resources among firms 
belonging to the same [business group]”. Top_4 is 1 for Top 4 client firms, 0 for non-Top 4 
client firms in year t and is expected to have a negative relationship with cost of equity capital 
(Azizkhani et al. 2010). Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees of firm i in year t and is 
expected to have a negative relationship with cost of equity capital (Francis and Krishnan 
1999). Ln_Assets is included as a proxy for firm size (measured by the natural log of current 
year total assets) because larger firms have been found to have a lower cost of equity capital, 
possibly due to lower perceived risk (Bachoo, Tan & Wilson 2013; Botosan and Plumlee 
2005). F_Lev is a proxy for financial leverage and is included because an increase in the 
proportion of debt in a firm‟s capital structure increases the riskiness of each unit of equity 
(Gebhardt, Lee & Swaminathan 2001; Modigliani and Miller 1958; Palea 2010). ROA is the 
proxy for firm growth and is expected to have a negative relationship with cost of equity 
capital (Azizkhani et al. 2010; Li 2010). VOLATILITY is a measure of a stock's average 
annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year and is expected to 
have a positive relationship with cost of equity capital (Azizkhani et al. 2010; Li 2010). 
Industry dummies are included to proxy for differences in firms‟ inherent business risk, while 
year dummies control for variation in the underlying risk-free rate across time. 
6. Results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
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We provide detailed descriptive statistics of firm characteristics for both │DACCR│, In_Sm  
and Ke full samples, and also report further portioning based on audit quality in Table 2. Panel 
A reports descriptive statistics for our │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke sample. The mean (median) 
value of the │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke full sample is 0.0006 (-0.0016), 2.9801 (0.5871) and 
0.1149 (0.0899) respectively. Of our full │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke sample, 51% of firms 
belong to a business group. The Top 4 audit firms in India audit 17% of our sample firms. 
Generally, our │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke sample firms are financially healthy with various 
performance and risk measures, such as F_LEV, ROA and L_Loss, all indicating so.  
[Insert Table 2] 
6.2 Univariate correlations 
We report Pearson pair-wise correlations for the variables in Table 3. Panel A reports the 
correlation matrix for our │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke full sample of 7,308 firm-year 
observations. As expected, GROUP is positively correlated with Top_4 (0.032) and Ln_Fees 
(0.128) at 1% significance level. Consistent with Chittoor et al. (2012), the GROUP variable 
is also negatively correlated with │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke (-0.062), (-0.024) and (0.028) 
respectively at 5% significance level. This suggests that when an Indian firm is affiliated to a 
business group there is an improvement in earnings quality and lower cost of equity capital 
through increased use of high quality audit assurance services. Observing the correlation 
between Top_4 negatively correlated with │DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke, (-0.028), (-0.018) and (-
0.012) at the 5%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively. Similarly, Ln_Fees and 
│DACCR│, In_Sm and Ke are negatively correlated (-0.056), (-0.034) and (-0.148) at 1% 
significance level. In addition, Top_4 and Ln_Fees are strongly and positively correlated 
(0.321) at 1% significance level. These findings suggest that as audit quality improves the 
level of audit fees increases, leading to a reduction in the level of earnings management when 
│DACCR│ is used as a proxy for earnings management.  
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6.3 Main results 
[Insert Table 4] 
6.3.1. Discretionary Accruals 
The discretionary accruals analysis is reported in Table 4 (columns 2 and 3). Two regression 
models are reported in which each audit quality proxy is tested one at a time. Both models are 
significant with adjusted R
2
 values of 9.8% and 9.5%, respectively. Significance levels of 
individual coefficients are reported as two-tailed tests. As expected, the coefficient for the 
relationship between Top_4 and discretionary accruals, is negative (Top_4 = -0.010, p=0.001). 
Overall, this outcome supports the hypothesis that higher audit quality leads to reduced 
│DACCR│, and therefore, better earnings quality. Similarly, the coefficient for the 
relationship between Ln_Fees and discretionary accruals, is negative (Ln_Fees= -0.005, 
p=0.005). Overall, this result supports previous findings that higher audit quality coincides 
with higher audit fees and that higher audit fees equate to better earnings quality.
9
 Observing 
the GROUP variable, our findings also provide support to claims that firms affiliated with 
business groups experience lower discretionary accruals (GROUP = -0.007, p=0.003 and 
GROUP = -0.006, p=0.016). This is expected because since group companies have more 
oversight scrutiny than non-group companies, it would be more damaging for them than non-
group firms to be caught manipulating earnings.  Finally, we find that the level of absolute 
discretionary accruals increases with F_Lev and ROA and decreases with Ln_Assets and 
L_Loss, indicating that as debt increases risk increases, therefore earnings management 
increases. Similar to this, companies increase their asset accumulation, risk decreases and as a 
result earnings management decreases. 
                                                             
9 As supported by DeAngelo (1981), Palmrose (1986), Carcello, Hermanson, Neal and Riley (2002) and Francis 
et al. (2004). 
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6.3.2. Income Smoothing 
The income smoothing analysis is reported in Table 4 (columns 4 and 5). Two regression 
models are reported in which each audit quality proxy is tested one at a time. Both models are 
significant with adjusted R
2
 values of 18.47% and 20.98%, respectively. Significance levels 
of individual coefficients are reported as two-tailed tests. The coefficient on the relationship 
between Top_4 and income smoothing is negative at (Top_4 = -0.3310, p=0.030). Overall, 
this result supports the hypothesis that higher audit quality is associated with lower income 
smoothing. Similarly, the coefficient for the relationship between Ln_Fees and income 
smoothing, is negative at (Ln_Fees= -0.3510, p=0.000). The GROUP variable provides 
support to claims that firms affiliated with business groups experience lower income 
smoothing (GROUP = -0.2914, p=0.016 and GROUP = -0.3030, p=0.000). This is because 
group companies have more certainty in the market compared to non-group companies. The 
control variables are in general consistent with earlier results. 
6.3.3. Cost of Equity Capital 
Finally, Table 4 (columns 6 and 7) reports the main results of our test of the overall 
relationship between audit quality and the cost of equity capital. Both models are significant 
with adjusted R
2
 values of 32.5% and 34.5%, respectively. As hypothesised, the coefficient 
on Top_4 is negative at (Top_4 = -0.015, p=0.008), supporting the hypothesis that when an 
Indian firm is audited by a Top 4 auditor, the cost of equity capital is lower. Similarly, the 
coefficient for the relationship between Ln_Fees and cost of equity capital is also negative at 
(Ln_Fees = -0.007, p=0.014).  The GROUP variable supports the claim that firms affiliated 
with business groups experience lower cost of equity capital (GROUP = -0.018, p=0.000 and 
GROUP = -0.025, p=0.000). This could be because since group companies are on average 
larger and are viewed as a safer option for investors, they are associated with lower risk than 
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non-group companies. Finally, we find that the cost of equity capital increases with F_Lev 
and VOLATILITY and decreases with Ln_Assets and ROA. 
7. Robustness tests 
7.1. Alternative measure of audit quality 
[Insert Table 5] 
To determine the robustness of our main results we test our data using Top_8 auditor as a 
proxy for audit quality. The purpose of this test is to ensure the strength of our findings 
beyond the Top 4 audit firms working in India. Consistent with our initial findings, results in 
Table 5 support our hypothesis that higher audit quality leads to lower earnings management, 
lower income smoothing and lower cost of equity capital. 
7.2. Excluding the global financial crisis period  
[Insert Table 6] 
Due to the volatile and inconsistent nature of the global economy during the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC), the inclusion of data beyond 2007 may lead to misleading results that 
do not accurately represent the effects of audit quality on discretionary accruals, income 
smoothing and cost of capital under a stable economy. To ensure the value of our results is 
not impaired by the sudden change in economic environment that occurred during the GFC, 
we have conducted a sensitivity analysis by removing GFC firm-year observations. Results 
reported in Table 6 are consistent with those initially reported in Table 4.  
7.3. Alternative measure for discretionary accruals  
[Insert Table 7] 
To determine the robustness of our results for the calculation of │DACCR│, reported in the 
preceding section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis that means using the Jones (1991) model, 
instead of the modified Jones (1991) model, for calculating the relationship between our 
chosen variables and earnings management, proxied by │DACCR│. The results of the Jones 
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(1991) model are consistent with those reported by the modified Jones model for all relevant 
variables. In particular, results for GROUP, Top_4 and Ln_Fees are all consistent with those 
reported in our main findings and significant at 1% level. 
We re-estimated Equation (5) by using Bloomberg cost of capital (derived by the 
CAPM) as an alternative proxy for the Ke in Indian Listed Companies. Results are also 
consistent with those initially reported in Table 6 and shows that higher audit quality leads to 
lower cost of equity capital.  
We also exclude the bottom quartile of our cost of equity capital sample to ensure the 
validity of our findings with a modified sample. We do this because firms in the bottom 
quartile are less likely to benefit from high-quality reporting as they already have low cost of 
equity (Dhaliwal et al. 2009). The results are generally consistent with earlier findings. 
 
8. Conclusion 
This study provides new evidence from India on the effects of audit quality on earnings 
quality (measured by discretionary accruals, income smoothing) and cost of equity capital. It 
also generates new evidence that: firstly, differing levels of audit quality incur audit fees of 
invariable amount; and secondly, business groups experience lower earnings management, 
lower income smoothing and lower cost of equity capital. 
Overall, our results are consistent with those expected, and they support our 
hypotheses. Referring to our first two hypotheses which speculate that audit quality will have 
a positive effect on earnings quality (reducing discretionary accruals) and income smoothing, 
we find that they hold true. Concerning our last hypothesis, which speculates that audit 
quality will have a positive effect in reducing the cost of equity capital, we find that this 
hypothesis also holds true. Our findings are significant and support the contention that as the 
quality of audit increases, the cost of equity capital decreases due to reduced information risk. 
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Using our Ke sample, we also find evidence to support the belief that there is a direct 
correlation between audit quality and audit fees. Our findings show that as audit quality 
improves, audit fees increase. 
 While the findings of this study may contribute to the literature on the relationship 
between audit quality and earnings quality and between audit quality and cost of equity 
capital, several limitations. Firstly, the use of Big-4 auditors as a monitoring mechanism for 
corporate governance is not the only method that a firm may employ to mitigate against 
earnings management, income smoothing and reducing the cost of equity capital. Secondly, 
we have not partitioned our sample to distinguish between private sector firms and SOEs. 
Separating our sample on a private and public sector basis may enhance our understanding of 
two relationships between: firstly, between audit quality and earnings quality; and secondly, 
audit quality and cost of equity capital. The usefulness of this form of partitioning will be 
substantial, especially when the vicissitudinous history of the corporate sector is considered 
relative to the history of the public sector in India While this study may reinforce some 
formerly proposed beliefs about the relationship between audit quality and earnings 
management, audit quality and income smoothing, audit quality and cost of equity capital, 
and audit quality and audit fees, in reality the findings from this study only permit 
generalisations from the perspective of India, and more broadly Asia and developing 
countries.  
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Table 1 
 
Descriptive Information on Sample Selection and its Composition by Year and Industry 
 
Panel A: Sample selection  
 
   DACCR & 
Ke 
Ln_Fees 
Total firm-year observations available on World Scope from 1998 – 2009, 
without missing values on dependent and independent variables 
 
8,408 
 
7,370 
 Less: Financial institutions ( 415) (415) 
         : Utilities and energy (296) (296) 
          Observations with any variables registering in the top and  
          bottom 1%  
 
(389) 
 
(185) 
Final Sample 7,308 6,474 
 
Panel B: Sample composition by year 
 
Year Earnings management (DACCR), Income 
Smoothing (In_Sm)& Cost of Equity capital 
(Ke) 
Audit Fees (Ln_Fees) 
# of firms-years in 
sample 
% of firms-years in 
sample 
# of firms-years in 
sample 
% of firms-years in 
sample 
1998   128 2.0 
1999 242 3.3 144 2.2 
2000 187 2.6 172 2.6 
2001 189 2.6 196 3.0 
2002 188 2.6 198 3.0 
2003 222 3.0 224 3.5 
2004 375 5.3 312 4.8 
2005 504 6.9 456 7.0 
2006 597 8.3 615 9.5 
2007 1576 21.2 1324 2.0 
2008 1614 22.1 1323 20.4 
2009 1614 22.1 1382 21.3 
Total 7,308 100 6,474 100 
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Panel C: Sample composition by industry 
 
Industry group Earnings management, Income 
smoothing & cost of equity capital 
Audit Fees (Ln_Fees) 
# of firms-
years in 
sample 
% of firms-years 
in sample 
# of firms-
years in 
sample 
% of firms-
years in 
sample 
Automobile & parts           479  6.5 412 6.4 
Basic resources 590 8.1 465 7.2 
Chemicals 787 10.8 654 10.1 
Construction & materials 558 7.6 524 8.1 
Food & beverages 447 6.1 368 5.7 
Health care 481 6.7 423 6.5 
Industrial goods & services 2079 28.4 1865 2.9 
Media 169 2.3 112 1.7 
Personal & household goods 890 12.2 824 12.7 
Real estate 75 1.0 68 1.1 
Retail 35 0.5 39 0.6 
Technology 532 7.3 528 8.2 
Telecommunications 47 0.7 59 0.9 
Travel & leisure 134 1.8 133 2.1 
Total 7,308 100 6,474 100 
  
Panel A explains the sample selection process. Panel B reports the sample composition by year. Panel C reports 
industry distribution of the sample. Industry groups are based on the industry classification benchmark (ICB) 
universe.  
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Table 2 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for DACCR, In_Sm & Ke sample (n=7,308) 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. 1
st
   percentile 99
th
 percentile 
|DACCR| 0.0006 0.0016 0.09851 -0.2850 0.2894 
In_Sm 2.9801 0.5871 80.3739 0.2510 1.1935 
Ke 0.1149 0.0899 0.08965 0.0246 0.4971 
GROUP 0.5100 1.0000 0.5000 0.0000 1.0000 
Top_4 0.1700 0.0000 0.3720 0.0000 1.0000 
Ln_Fees 6.5808 6.5667 1.5272 3.0445 10.2100 
Ln_Assets 14.9978 14.9471 1.67484 11.4032 19.3169 
F_Lev 0.5099 0.5527 0.25453 0.0010 0.9378 
ROA 0.0778 0.0686 0.10647 -0.2315 0.3678 
L_Loss 0.1400 0.0000 0.3520 0.0000 1.0000 
VOLATILITY 40.1267 39.3600 9.93175 21.9684 64.6192 
 
|DACCRit| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under Modified Jones model 
(Dechow et al. 1995). In_Sm is the ratio of the standard deviation of earnings to cash flow from operations of 
firm. Ke is the cost of equity of firm i in year t measured by Easton (2004) model. GROUP is 1 for a firm that 
belongs to a business group, 0 for a firm that is in a non-business group in year t. Top_4 is 1 for Top 4 client 
firms, 0 for non-Top 4 client firms in year t. Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees of firm i in year t. 
Ln_Assets is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets of 
firm i in year t. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items for a firm i in year t scaled by total assets. 
L_Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t and t-1reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 if 
otherwise. VOLATILITY is a measure of a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a 
mean price for each year.  
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Table 3 
 
Correlation among the Dependent variables (|DACCR|, In_Sm, Ke) and selected variables 
 
 |DACCR| In_Sm Ke GROUP Top_4 Ln_Fees 
 
|DACCR| 
 
1 
 
     
In_Sm 0.014 
(0.058) 
1     
Ke 0.001 
(0.258) 
0.000 
(0.394) 
1    
GROUP -0.062 
(0.043) 
-0.024 
(0.056) 
-0.028 
(0.042) 
1   
Top_4 -0.028 
(0.006) 
-0.018 
(0.042) 
-0.012 
(0.001) 
0.032 
(0.001) 
1  
Ln_Fees -0.056 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.001) 
-0.148 
(0.000) 
0.128 
(0.002) 
0.321 
(0.000) 
1 
 
Note: p-values are in parentheses.  
 
|DACCRit| is the absolute value of discretionary accruals of firm i in year t according to the modified Jones 
model (Dechow et al. 1995). In_Sm is the ratio of the standard deviation of earnings to cash flow from 
operations of firm. Ke is the cost of equity capital using the modified PEG approach (Easton 2004). GROUP is 
1 for a firm that belongs to a business group, 0 for a firm that is a non-business group in year t. Top_4 is 1 for 
Top 4 client firms, 0 for non-Top 4 client firms in year t. Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees of firm 
i in year t. 
  
39 
 
Table 4 
Regression Results of Absolute Discretionary Accruals, Income Smoothing and Cost of Equity 
 
|DACCRit| = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Audit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α 6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε…………………………..…………………... (4) 
In_Smit = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε……………………………………….…….… (5) 
Keit = α0 + α1GROUPit+ α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6VOLATILITYit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε ……………………………………..... (6) 
 
Variable Earnings management (|DACCR|) 
 
Income Smoothing (In_Sm) 
 
Cost of Equity Capital (Ke) 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Top_4 Ln_Fees Top_4 Ln_Fees Top_4 Ln_Fees 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Intercept 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
0.040*** 
(0.002) 
3.9010 
(0.000) 
3.8914 
(0.000) 
0.108*** 
(0.003) 
0.099*** 
(0.004) 
GROUP -0.007
*** 
(0.003) 
-0.006
** 
(0.016) 
-0.2914
 
(0.041) 
-0.3030
 
(0.000) 
-0.018
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.025
*** 
(0.000) 
Top_4 -0.010
*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.3310 
(0.030) 
 -0.015
*** 
(0.008) 
 
Ln_Fees  -0.005
*** 
(0.000) 
 -.3510 
(0.000) 
 -0.007
** 
(0.014) 
Ln_Asset
s 
-0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.267) 
-0.1610 
(0.000) 
-0.1809 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004** 
(0.031) 
F_Lev 0.026*** 
(0.000) 
0.020*** 
(0.000) 
0.1289 
(0.031) 
0.1675 
(0.029) 
0.070*** 
(0.000) 
0.078*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 0.136
*** 
(0.000) 
0.136*** 
(0.000) 
0.1289 
(0.2010) 
0.1001 
(0.3814) 
-0.051* 
(0.067) 
-0.071** 
(0.021) 
L_Loss -0.061*** 
(0.000) 
-0.058*** 
(0.000) 
0.2410 
(0.000) 
0.2931 
(0.000) 
  
Volatility     0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Year 
dummies 
included included included included included included 
Industry 
dummies 
included included included included included included 
Adj.R
2 
0.098 0.095 0.1847 0.2098 0.325 0.345 
N 7,308 6,474 7,308 6,474 7308 6,474 
 
Note: p-values are in parentheses.  
|DACCRit| is the absolute discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 1995).  In_Sm is the ratio of the standard deviation of earnings to cash flow from operations of firm. GROUP 
is 1 for a firm that belongs to a business group, 0 for a firm that is in a non-business group in year t. Top_4 is 1 
for Top 4 client firms, 0 for non-Top 4 client firms in year t. Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees of 
firm i in year t. Ln_Assets is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_Lev is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets of firm i in year t. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items for a firm i in year t scaled by 
total assets. L_Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t and t-1reports negative income before extraordinary 
items and 0 if otherwise. Year dummies, a vector of dummy variables, indicate year. Industry dummies, a vector 
of dummy variables, indicate industry sector membership. 
 
***significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *significant at the 0.10 level 
(2-tailed). 
 Table 5 
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Regression Results of Absolute Discretionary Accruals, Income Smoothing and Cost of Equity 
(alternative measure of audit quality) 
DACCRit| = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Audit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α 6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε…………………………..…………………... (4) 
In_Smit = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε……………………………………….…….… (5) 
Keit = α0 + α1GROUPit+ α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6VOLATILITYit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε ……………………………………..... (6) 
 
Variable Earnings management (|DACCR|) Income Smoothing (In_Sm) Cost of Equity Capital (Ke) 
Top_8 Top_8 Top_8 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Intercept 0.060*** 
(0.000) 
3.9000*** 
(0.000) 
0.102*** 
(0.002) 
GROUP -0.007
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.2989
** 
(0.021) 
-0.018
*** 
(0.000) 
Top_8 -0.006
** 
(0.017) 
-0.3541
** 
(0.010) 
-0.012
** 
(0.018) 
Ln_Assets -0.005*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1600*** 
(0.000) 
-0.008*** 
(0.000) 
F_Lev 0.028*** 
(0.000) 
0.1410** 
(0.021) 
0.070*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 0.135
*** 
(0.000) 
0.1210 
(0.2000) 
-0.054* 
(0.061) 
L_Loss -0.060*** 
(0.000) 
0.2241*** 
(0.000) 
 
Volatility   0.004*** 
(0.000) 
Year 
dummies 
included included included 
Industry 
dummies 
included included included 
Adj.R
2 0.098 0.241 0.295 
N 7,308 7,308 7,308 
 
Note: p-values are in parentheses.  
|DACCRit| is the absolute discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 1995).  In_Sm is the ratio of the standard deviation of earnings to cash flow from operations of firm. GROUP 
is 1 for a firm that belongs to a business group, 0 for a firm that is in a non-business group in year t. Top_4 is 1 
for Top 4 client firms, 0 for non-Top 4 client firms in year t. Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees of 
firm i in year t. Ln_Assets is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_Lev is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets of firm i in year t. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items for a firm i in year t scaled by 
total assets. L_Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t and t-1reports negative income before extraordinary 
items and 0 if otherwise. Year dummies, a vector of dummy variables, indicate year. Industry dummies, a vector 
of dummy variables, indicate industry sector membership. 
 
*** significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); * significant at the 0.10 
level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
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Regression Results of Absolute Discretionary Accruals, Income Smoothing and Cost of Equity 
(Excluding the GFC period) 
DACCRit| = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Audit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α 6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε…………………………..…………………... (4) 
In_Smit = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε……………………………………….…….… (5) 
Keit = α0 + α1GROUPit+ α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6VOLATILITYit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε ……………………………………..... (6) 
 
 
 
Variable Earnings management (|DACCR|) Income Smoothing 
(In_Sm) 
Cost of Equity Capital (Ke) 
Top_4 Ln_Fees Top_4 Ln_Fees Top_4 Ln_Fees 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Intercept 0.023* 
(0.068) 
0.004 
(0.780) 
4.1010*** 
(0.000) 
4.5141*** 
(0.000) 
0.101** 
(0.013) 
0.084* 
(0.062) 
GROUP -0.010
*** 
(0.003) 
-0.009
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.3215
** 
(0.021) 
-0.3541
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.018
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.024
*** 
(0.001) 
Top_4 -0.010
*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.3641
** 
(0.020) 
 -0.016
*** 
(0.005) 
 
Ln_Fees  -0.004
*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.3641
*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.008
*** 
(0.009) 
Ln_Assets -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.492) 
-0.1425*** 
(0.000) 
-0.1941*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.004 
(0.154) 
F_Lev 0.032*** 
(0.000) 
0.027*** 
(0.000) 
0.1410** 
(0.010) 
0.1710** 
(0.021) 
0.055*** 
(0.000) 
0.055*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 0.148
*** 
(0.000) 
0.149*** 
(0.000) 
0.1341 
(0.1651) 
0.1121 
(0.3012) 
-0.087** 
(0.013) 
-0.110*** 
(0.004) 
L_Loss -0.053*** 
(0.000) 
-0.050*** 
(0.000) 
0.2741*** 
(0.000) 
0.2985*** 
(0.000) 
  
Volatility     0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
Year 
dummies 
included included included included included included 
Industry 
dummies 
included included included included included included 
Adj.R
2 
0.126 0.116 0.2257 0.2325 0.315 0.324 
N 2,504 2,445 2,504 2,445 2,504 2,445 
 
Note: p-values are in parentheses.  
|DACCRit| is the absolute discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 1995).  In_Sm is the ratio of the standard deviation of earnings to cash flow from operations of firm. GROUP 
is 1 for a firm that belongs to a business group, 0 for a firm that is in a non-business group in year t. Top_4 is 1 
for Top 4 client firms, 0 for non-Top 4 client firms in year t. Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees of 
firm i in year t. Ln_Assets is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_Lev is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets of firm i in year t. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items for a firm i in year t scaled by 
total assets. L_Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t and t-1reports negative income before extraordinary 
items and 0 if otherwise. Year dummies, a vector of dummy variables, indicate year. Industry dummies, a vector 
of dummy variables, indicate industry sector membership. 
 
***significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *significant at the 0.10 level 
(2-tailed). 
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Table 7 
Regression Results of Absolute Discretionary Accruals and Cost of Equity (Alternative 
measures) 
 
DACCRit| = α0 + α1GROUPit + α2Audit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α 6L_Lossit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε…………………………..…………………... (4) 
Keit = α0 + α1GROUPit+ α2Auditit (Top_4 or Ln_Fees) + α3Ln_Assetsit + α4F_Levit + α5ROAit + 
α6VOLATILITYit + Year fixed effects + Industry fixed effects + ε ……………………………………..... (6) 
 
Variable Earnings management (|DACCR|) CAPM Cost of Equity 
Capital (Ke) 
Excluding Bottom quartile 
Cost of Equity Capital (Ke) 
Top_4 Ln_Fees Top_4 Ln_Fees Top_4 Ln_Fees 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Estimate 
(ρ-value) 
Intercept 0.049*** 
(0.000) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.201*** 
(0.000) 
0.182*** 
(0.000) 
0.186*** 
(0.000) 
0.172*** 
(0.001) 
GROUP -0.007
*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005
*** 
(0.001) 
-0.019
*** 
(0.004) 
-0.028***
 
(0.000) 
-0.018
*** 
(0.005) 
-0.027
*** 
(0.000) 
Top_4 -0.010
*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.015
** 
(0.041) 
 -0.012
* 
(0.056) 
 
Ln_Fees  -0.005
*** 
(0.003) 
 -0.006
*** 
(0.000) 
 -0.005
 
(0.135) 
Ln_Assets -0.004*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.526) 
-0.012*** 
(0.000) 
-0.009** 
(0.021) 
-0.010*** 
(0.000) 
-0.007** 
(0.038) 
F_Lev 0.024*** 
(0.000) 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.081*** 
(0.000) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
0.073*** 
(0.000) 
0.078*** 
(0.000) 
ROA 0.133
*** 
(0.000) 
0.132*** 
(0.000) 
-0.076** 
(0.041) 
-0.088** 
(0.024) 
-0.071* 
(0.056) 
-0.087** 
(0.048) 
L_Loss -0.050*** 
(0.000) 
-0.047*** 
(0.000) 
    
Volatility   0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
Year 
dummies 
included included included included included included 
Industry 
dummies 
included included included included included included 
Adj.R
2 
0.081 0.085 0.2257 0.2325 0.355 0.364 
N 7,308 6,474 7,308 6,474 5,287 4,876 
 
Note: p-values are in parentheses.  
|DACCRit| is the absolute discretionary accruals of firm i in year t under the Jones model (1991).  In_Sm is the 
ratio of the standard deviation of earnings to cash flow from operations of firm. GROUP is 1 for a firm that 
belongs to a business group, 0 for a firm that is in a non-business group in year t. Top_4 is 1 for Top 4 client 
firms, 0 for non-Top 4 client firms in year t. Ln_Fees is the natural logarithm of audit fees of firm i in year t. 
Ln_Assets is natural logarithm of total assets of firm i in year t. F_Lev is the ratio of total debt to total assets of 
firm i in year t. ROA is the net income before extraordinary items for a firm i in year t scaled by total assets. 
L_Loss takes the value of 1 if firm i in year t and t-1reports negative income before extraordinary items and 0 if 
otherwise. Year dummies, a vector of dummy variables, indicate year. Industry dummies, a vector of dummy 
variables, indicate industry sector membership. 
 
***significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); **significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed); *significant at the 0.10 level 
(2-tailed). 
